We develop a model of a small open economy, where pollution per unit of consumption between domestically produced and imported quantities of the same good di¤ers. We show that the …rst-best policy combination calls for consumption taxes on all polluting goods, and Border Tax Adjustment (BTA) measures, i.e., tari¤s or import subsidies. We identify conditions under which well known tari¤-tax reform policies for developing economies, such as a consumer-price-neutral piecemeal reform of a trade and a consumption tax, and a consumer-price-neutral reform of all trade and consumption taxes improve welfare. We also evaluate whether a consumer-price-neutral reform of a tari¤ and a consumption tax is superior to a reform of a tari¤ alone.
Introduction
Nowadays, consumption and residential activities are considered important sources of pollution emissions such as carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and solid waste accumulation, e.g., Hu and McKitrick (2016) . 1 In many cases, the same consumer needs are satis…ed by di¤erent commodities produced in di¤erent countries using di¤erent materials and technologies. The consumption of such di¤erent varieties of the same product produced in one country or imported, satisfying the same consumer needs, may generate di¤erent rates of pollution per unit of consumption. For example, di¤erent brands of automobiles, air-conditioners and other electrical appliances, tires, etc., produced by di¤erent …rms in di¤erent countries, have di¤erent energy requirements and thus they are attributed di¤erent energy classi…cations. 2 To address this phenomenon, we construct a theoretical model of a competitive small open economy producing and consuming many traded goods. The consumption of goods generates pollution. The distinctive element in this modelling is that pollution per unit of imports consumption of a good di¤ers from pollution per unit of consumption of the same commodity produced domestically. Within this framework we show that the …rst-best policy combination requires (i) consumption taxes on all polluting goods. While consumption taxes on imported and on domestically produced quantities of the same good are the same, they di¤er across commodities depending on their rates of pollution per unit of consumption; (ii) free-trade for all exportable goods, and (iii) a tari¤ (import subsidy) or free-trade on an importable if pollution per unit of imports consumption is higher (lower) or the same with pollution per unit of consumption of the domestically produced quantities of this good.
Studies which examine the optimal policies under consumption pollution externalities propose that for small open economies, the …rst-best policy combination requires an emission tax to control for the consumption pollution externality, and free trade, e.g., Krutilla
(1991), Gulati and Roy (2008) , Copeland (2011) and Chao et al. (2012) . 3 However, more often than not, for political or political economy reasons emission taxes may be set at suboptimal levels. For example, the implementation of Pigouvian emission taxes is infeasible in the presence of lobbying activities by large polluters, corruption, weak administrative capacity or technical and economic reasons, e.g., Eisenbarth (2017) , McAusland (2008) , Fullerton and West (2002) . In these cases, governments can resort to other forms of taxation such as consumption and trade taxes. 4 In this paper we show that, in the absence of emission taxes and when the rates of pollution per unit of consumption between imported and domestically produced quantities of the same good di¤er, the …rst-best policy requires
Border Tax Adjustment (BTA) measures, such as tari¤s or import subsidies, in addition to consumption taxes on all polluting goods. 5 This …rst-best policy is equivalent to the …rst-best policy of emission taxes and zero trade taxes in terms of its e¤ects on producer and consumer prices. The idea of BTA measures in the trade and environment literature is a topical issue, see Larch and Wanner (2017, pp.195-196) . Recently, Fischer and Fox (2012) , Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) , and Böhringer et al. (2017) , invoke the need for such measures in order to mitigate carbon leakage e¤ects in the presence of production generated cross-border pollution. 6 Here the source of pollution is the consumption rather 3 In the context of large open economies, and the existence of terms of trade motives, the optimal trade policy is no longer free trade but a tari¤, e.g., Syropoulos (2002) . 4 Real world evidence attests to the use of consumption taxes, e.g., taxes on energy consuming products, vehicles, mineral oils and on transport fuels, to encourage more environmetally resposible economic and recreational activites. For example, OECD (2014) pp. 135-160, reports: Per litre total taxation (VAT + excise) on premium unleaded gasoline: Australia 0:51, Canada 0:39, Germany 1:20, the U.K. 1:25, the U.S. 0:14. Per litre total taxation (VAT + excise) on light fuel oil for households: Austria 0:35, Germany 0:25, the Netherlands 0:81, the U.K. 0:37. Taxes on sales and registration of motor vehicles: Belgium V AT 21% + Entry into Service Tax (age, engine power, CO 2 emissions, type of fuel gas), Germany VAT 19%, Spain VAT 21% + Vehicle Registration Tax (CO 2 emissions), the US gas guzzler tax (fuel e¢ ciency).
5 Eisenbarth (2017) reports that since 2007 China has introduced export taxes and reduced export value-added tax (VAT) rebates on exports of pollution-, energy-, and resource-intensive products, in order to promote an environmentally friendlier trade structure, in accordance to Article XX of the GATT allowing exemption from GATT rules for environmental objectives (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_-e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm).
than the production activity, and the rates of pollution per unit of consumption between imported and domestically produced quantities of the same good di¤er.
Recently, the rapid and deepening globalization, and freer trade via reductions in trade taxes has been a consistent trend in the world economy. Since trade taxes, i.e., import tari¤s and export taxes, constitute a major source of government revenue in many developing countries, their reduction has substantially lowered government revenues. To recoup these revenues losses a standard IMF and World Bank reform proposal, particularly to developing economies, is the pursuit of various types of coordinated tax reforms.
Such is, reducing trade taxes and increasing domestic taxes, e.g., consumption or valueadded (V AT ) taxes, without, however, compromising governments'…scal viability. These policy recommendations are addressed in a literature that examines the implications of di¤erent types of trade and domestic tax reforms on welfare, government tax revenues and market access, e.g., Michael et al. Within the present framework where pollution per unit of imports consumption of a good di¤ers from pollution per unit of consumption of the same commodity produced domestically, we identify conditions under which the reforms proposed by the international institutions and examined in the relevant literature can improve welfare, raise government revenue, and possibly reduce pollution. That is, we aim at designing trade and consumption tax reform policies which can achieve a double, or even a triple dividend. To this end, we investigate two popular reform policies, …rst a selective consumer-price-neutral reform, i.e., a reduction of the trade tax and a change of the consumption tax so that the consumer price of the good carrying the highest, what we call, welfare cost ratios remains constant. Such a reform is welfare improving when it moves towards uniformity the welfare cost ratios. The latter measure is the per unit of price welfare cost of increasing production of a good by one unit, and reducing its imports by one unit, holding everything else constant. Second, we show that a policy of reducing only the tari¤ on a good is welfare superior to a consumer-price-neutral reduction in the tari¤ and increase in consumption tax rate on it, if this good, aside of being substitute to all other goods in consumption, (i) it carries the highest tari¤ rate, and (ii) its imported quantities generate the lowest rate of pollution per unit of consumption relative to all other imported and exported quantities. Finally, we show that a consumer-price-neutral adjustment in trade and consumption taxes according to what we call welfare cost rule is welfare improving. 7 
The Model
Consider a perfectly competitive small open economy with a representative agent, producing and consuming N internationally traded goods. Of these goods, the …rst K are the country's importables, and the remaining N K are its exportables. and is written as: 7 A more recent and growing trade and environment literature considers the welfare implications of various reform policies such as a piecemeal movement of trade and environmental taxes towards their optimal levels. In the presence of production generated pollution, see, e.g., Copeland, (1994), Neary (2006) , Kreickemeier and Richter (2016) , Yanase (2017) , and in the presence of consumption generated pollution see, e.g., Chao et al. e (q; z; u) = r (p) + G; (1) where e (q; z; u) denotes the representative agent's minimum expenditure on commodities needed to achieve a given level of welfare u at consumer prices q and consumption pollution z. By the properties of the expenditure function, the partial derivative e q j @e @q j , j = 1; :::N , is the compensated demand function for the j th commodity, and e q is the vector of the country's compensated demand functions. The partial derivative e z @e @z
, is the marginal willingness to pay for pollution reduction, and the partial derivative e u @e @u
, denotes the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income. It is assumed that the compensated demands do not depend on pollution, i.e., e qz = 0:
8 The e(:) function is increasing in z and u, and non-decreasing and concave in q, i.e., eis a (N N ) negative semide…nite matrix. 9 The country's Gross Domestic Product function (GDP) is given by r (p) and denotes the maximum value of output at producers prices p, given the country's …xed factor supplies and production technologies. 10 Factor supplies are omitted from the GDP function since throughout the analysis are considered …xed. The partial derivative,
, denotes the supply function of the j th commodity, and r p is the vector of the country's supply functions of the commodities. The r (p) function is homogeneous of degree one and convex in p, i.e., r pp is a positive semi-de…nite matrix.
Government revenues from trade and consumption taxes are given by:
8 The general speci…cation of the minimum expenditure function in the presence of pollution can be written as e (q; z; u) = min
x is the vector of consumptions, v is increasing and concave, and h is increasing and convex. The e (:) function implies complete separability between consumption and pollution, i.e., e qj z = 0, 8 j = 1; :::N , ensuring that relative demands are independent of the environmental damage. 9 The e(:) function is increasing in z in the sense that when pollution increases the expenditures on goods must also increase in order to keep welfare constant. For details of the properties of the expenditure function in the presence of pollution see, e.g., Neary (2006) , Copeland (2011) . 10 We can write r (p) = max
, where F (X; ) is the aggregate production possibilities set, X is the vector of goods produced, and is the vector of (…xed) factor supplies. where M = e q (q; z; u) r p (p) denotes the vector of compensated excess demand functions.
An element of this vector is positive (negative), i.e., e q j r p j > (<)0, indicating imports (exports) of the j th good.
The consumption of goods generates pollution. We assume that pollution per unit of consumption between the imported and the domestically produced quantities of the same good di¤er. For the j th importable good, let a j be the pollution per unit of consumption of imports, and a j be the pollution per unit of consumption of its quantities domestically produced. For an exportable good, a j denotes pollution per unit of its domestic consumption. Then, overall pollution (z) is de…ned as follows:
The …rst bracketed right-hand-side term in the …rst line of equation (3) captures pollution from consumption of the domestically produced quantities of importable goods and pollution from consumption of imports. The second bracketed right-hand-side term captures pollution from domestic consumption of the exportable goods. 11 The equilibrium of this economy is described by equations (1), (2) and (3), which constitute a system of three equations with three endogenous variables, i.e., u, z, and G.
Optimal trade and consumption taxes
Equations (1), (2) and (3) determine the optimal trade and consumption taxes in our model. Totally di¤erentiating equations (2) and (3) with respect to the trade and consumption tax on the i th commodity, and noting that dq i = dt i + d i and dp i = dt i , yields:
(t j + j ) e q j u du, and (4)
Di¤erentiating equation (1) and using equations (4) and (5) yields the welfare changes due to changes in t i and i as follows:
where
a j e q j u ! is positive. In the analysis to follow we assume that all goods are normal in consumption, i.e., e q j u > 0, 8 j = 1; :::N . The optimal choice of i that maximizes welfare requires the following …rst-order-condition:
Substituting this result into the …rst-order-condition determining the optimal choice of t i , i.e., du dt i = 0 we obtain:
Repeating the analysis for all N commodities, we obtain a system of N equations in 
Equations (9) indicate that, if the j th commodity is an importable, then the optimal trade policy is a tari¤ (import subsidy) if the pollution per unit of imports consumption of this j th commodity exceeds (is smaller than) the pollution per unit of consumption of its domestically produced quantities. For example, if a j < a j , then the optimal trade policy for this good is a tari¤. The intuition is simple. Since the consumption of imports of this good create more pollution than the consumption of quantities domestically produced, it is optimum to reduce imports and increase domestic production by imposing a tari¤.
In the case where a j = a j , i.e., pollution per unit of consumption of imports and of domestically produced quantities of the j th good are the same, then the optimal policy for the j th importable good is free trade. If the j th commodity is an exportable, then the optimal trade policy is free trade.
Substituting equations (9) into the …rst-order condition (7), we get
Repeating for all N commodities, we obtain a system of N equations in N unknowns, whose solution gives the vector of the optimal consumption taxes 
The following conclusions emerge from equations (9) and (11) . First, tari¤s (import subsidies) is the optimal trade policy for the importable goods, and zero export taxes (subsidies) is the optimal policy for the exportables. In this sense, it is the optimal trade policy that corrects for the di¤erence in pollution per unit of consumption between the imported quantities and the quantities of the same goods that are domestically produced.
Second, the optimum consumption tax on any j th importable good is uniform on all quantities consumed, both domestically produced and imported, and it depends on the rate of pollution per unit of consumption of the domestically produced quantities. 
Selective consumer-price-neutral reform
First, we examine the welfare, tax revenue and pollution implications of a marginal consumer-price-neutral tax piecemeal reform. This reform entails a marginal reduction of the trade tax and a change in the consumption tax on the n th commodity, so that its consumer price remains constant i.e., dq n = dt n + d n = 0. By the properties of the GDP function, i.e., supply functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices, i.e., N X j=1 p j r p j pn = 0; we have r pnpn = N X j6 =n p j pn r p j pn , and by the reciprocity condition we also have r p j pn = r pnp j . Using the above properties in equation (6), the welfare e¤ect of this reform is given as follows: du = [t n + e z (a n a n )] r pnpn dt n X j6 =n
where r p j pn < (>)0 depending on whether the j th and n th commodities are substitutes (complements) in production, and i =
, if the i th good is an importable.
is the e¤ect of increasing the tari¤ rate on welfare due to the exacerbation of the production distortion. i captures the induced pollution e¤ect, as a fraction of producers' price, of consuming one unit of domestically produced output of the i th good, instead of consuming one unit of imports of the same commodity. If either a i = a i or the i th good is an exportable, then i = 0. Thus, i is the per unit of price welfare cost of increasing production of the i th good by one unit, and reducing its imports by one unit, holding everything else constant. We call i the welfare cost ratio of the i th good.
In the context of a small open economy, it is well known that trade taxes entail a production and a consumption distortions which a¤ect welfare negatively. The proposed reform, leaves consumer prices unchanged, and it reduces the producers price of the n th good, thus a¤ecting the production of all goods. This change in production a¤ects (i) the production distortions, and (ii) pollution when the rates of pollution per unit of consumption between imported and domestically produced quantities of the same good di¤er. The production distortions e¤ect of the above reform policy is given by (du=dt n ) = X j6 =n tn pn t j p j p j r p j pn regardless of whether the n th good is an exportable or an importable. This is the standard result of the literature in consumer-price-neutral piecemeal reforms of trade and consumption taxes, e.g., Keen and Ligthart (2002) . This reform policy is welfare improving when it moves the trade tax ratios t i pi towards uniformity. Su¢ cient, but not necessary, conditions for this result to hold are that the n th commodity (i) is a substitute to all other goods in production, and (ii) it carries the highest trade tax per its price. Intuitively, when we reduce the tari¤ rate on the n th good and increase the consumption tax so that its consumer price remains constant, then this policy reduces its production and increases the production of all other goods since they are substitutes in production. This reduces the production distortion created by the tari¤ on the n th good, and increases the production distortions created by the existence of trade taxes on all other goods. Since the tari¤ on the n th good is the highest, the gain from the reduction in its production distortion outweighs the increase in production distortions on all other goods.
When the n th good is an importable, in addition to the production distortions e¤ect there is also a pollution e¤ect, given by e z X j6 =n n j p j r p j pn . If the n th good carries the highest di¤erence in the rates of pollution per unit of consumption between the domestically produced and imported quantities relative to all other goods, then the reduction in its production and increase in imports reduces overall pollution.
Here, as indicated by equation (12), and in contrast to the standard reform result, for the consumer-price-neutral piecemeal reform to be welfare improving, it is required that it moves towards uniformity the welfare cost ratios. That is, in the present framework, this reform policy to be welfare improving it is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient condition to reduce the highest trade tax, but to reduce the trade tax on the commodity bearing the highest ratio. For example, a consumer-price-neutral reform of tari¤s is welfare improving if in addition to the above standard conditions (i) and (ii), it is also required that (iii) the n th importable commodity exhibits the highest positive di¤erence in pollution per unit of consumption between domestically produced and imported quantities, relative to all other goods. In the unlikely case where the commodity bearing the highest welfare cost ratio, in absolute terms, is an exportable, then by reducing the export tax on it improves welfare, if this good is a substitute in production to all other goods.
The e¤ect of the reform policy on the level of pollution, using equation (5), is given as follows:
Recall from equation (12) that the su¢ cient conditions under which the particular consumerprice-neutral reform improves welfare, leads to an ambiguous e¤ect on the overall level of consumption pollution. The intuition of the result is straightforward. On the one hand, the reform induced welfare improvement increases consumption and consumption generated pollution. On the other, the particular piecemeal reform by lowering domestic production of the n th good and increasing production of all other goods, decreases overall consumption pollution since the di¤erence in pollution per unit of consumption between the domestically produced and imported quantities of the n th importable good is the highest relative to all other goods. Clearly, when a j = a j , 8j, or if the n th good is an exportable, then a welfare improving consumer-price-neutral reform of trade and consumption taxes is also pollution aggravating.
Using the properties of the revenue function, and equation (4) and (12), we can get the e¤ect of this reform program on government revenue as follows:
It is clear from equation (14) that the reduction in the tari¤ rate on the n th good increases government revenue if (i) the conditions that increase welfare as stated above are satis…ed, and (ii) (t j + j ) is non-negative for all goods. The above results are summarized in the following Proposition. is a substitute in production to all other goods. This policy is also revenue increasing if in addition to the above conditions, (t j + j ) > 0; 8j also holds.
Only tari¤ vs. tari¤ and consumption tax reform
We now compare the welfare e¤ects of a marginal consumer-price-neutral piecemeal reform of a tari¤ and consumption tax, to those of a piecemeal tari¤ reform only. For this comparison to be valid, we assume the same initial equilibrium conditions and zero initial consumption taxes, e.g., Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008) .
Using the properties of the expenditure function i.e.,
q j e q j qn = 0; yields e qnqn = N X j6 =n q j qn e q j qn and by the reciprocity we have e q j qn = e qnq j : Note that when e q j qn > 0(< 0) the n th importable good is a substitute (complement) to the j th good in consumption.
Using the above properties, in the case of the piecemeal tari¤ reform only, the e¤ect on the levels of pollution and welfare are given by the following equations:
where i = t i eza i q i , i = j; n; and " j = t j eza j q j . Subtracting equation (5) from equation (15), we obtain:
a j q j a n q n q j e q j qn :
Equation (18) indicates that, if the n th importable commodity (i) is a substitute to all other goods in consumption, and (ii) its imported quantities exhibit the lowest pollution per unit of consumption as a fraction of its consumer price relative to all other imported and exported quantities, su¢ cient but not necessary conditions, then the right hand side of the equation is positive. This implies that reducing only the tari¤ rate is a superior piecemeal reform policy in terms of its e¤ect on the level of pollution, than reducing the tari¤ rate and increasing its consumption tax so as to keep its consumer price constant. 12 Intuitively, since a tari¤ is a production subsidy and a consumption tax, the reduction in the tari¤ alone, reduces the consumption tax on this good, increases its consumption and reduces the consumption of all other goods. Since the n th good causes the lowest pollution per unit of consumption relative to all other goods, the increase in pollution due to increase in its consumption is small relative to the decrease in pollution from the reduction in the consumption of all other goods. In the case where along with the decrease in the tari¤ we have also an increase in the consumption tax, the previous e¤ect does not emerge since the consumer price do not change, therefore the consumption of goods and pollution do not change. Reversing condition (ii) above, however, i.e., letting the imported quantities of the n th commodity exhibit the highest rate of pollution per unit of consumption as a fraction of its consumer price relative to all other imported and exported quantities, then the right hand side of equation (18) is negative. In this case, reducing only the tari¤ rate is an inferior piecemeal reform policy in terms of its e¤ect on the level of pollution, than reducing the tari¤ rate and increasing its consumption tax so as to keep its consumer price constant.
To examine the welfare e¤ects of the two piecemeal reform policies, we subtract equation (16) from (12) ; and noting that initially = 0; to obtain:
The comparison of the welfare e¤ects of the two tax reform programs rests on two e¤ects. The …rst e¤ect, we call it the consumption distortion e¤ect, is the welfare comparison result in the relevant tax reform literature, e.g., Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008) . It captures the direct welfare change of reducing the tari¤ alone as opposed to a consumer-price-neutral reduction in the tari¤ and increase in the consumption tax.
Speci…cally, in the context of a small open economy, the reduction of a tari¤ entails a double e¢ ciency gain, i.e., a reduction in production and consumption distortions, while the consumer-price-neutral reform entails only the production e¢ ciency gain, retaining the consumption distortion since consumer prices remain unchanged. The second e¤ect, we call it the pollution e¤ect, is the new e¤ect brought forth by our analysis. It captures the e¤ect of the change in pollution on welfare as a result of the two tax reform programs, when the rates of consumption pollution between imported and domestically produced quantities of a good di¤er.
Equation (19) shows that if the right hand side is negative (positive) then a marginal consumer-price-neutral reduction in the tari¤ rate and an increase in the consumption tax on the n th good which leaves its consumer price constant, is a welfare inferior (superior) policy compared to a policy which only reduces the tari¤ rate on this commodity.
Su¢ cient, but not necessary, conditions for the reduction in the tari¤ rate on n th good to be a welfare superior reform relative to the other policy are that the n th good (i) is a substitute to all other goods in consumption, (ii) carries the highest tari¤ per unit of price, and (iii) its imported quantities exhibit the lowest rate of pollution per unit of consumption as a fraction of its consumer price, relative to all other imported and exported quantities. 13 If, however, (i) its imported quantities exhibit the highest rate of pollution per unit of consumption as a fraction of its consumer price relative to all other imported and exported quantities, and (ii) this negative pollution e¤ect outweighs the consumption distortion e¤ect, then the consumer-price-neutral tax reform is a welfare superior policy than reducing the tari¤ rate alone. In the absence of consumption generated pollution, or when pollution per unit of consumption per price is the same for all quantities, imported and domestically produced, the second term in equation (19) is zero. In this case, if conditions (i) and (ii) hold, our analysis reproduces the standard result, i.e., that a marginal reduction of the tari¤ rate on the n th good alone is a welfare superior policy compared to the case of a consumer-price-neutral tax reform.
Proposition 3
Consider a small open economy where the consumption of goods generates pollution. Assume that the n th importable commodity (i) is a substitute to all other goods in consumption and (ii) it carries the highest tari¤ rate per unit of price.
If its imported quantities exhibit the lowest rate of pollution per unit of consumption as a fraction of its consumer price, relative to all other imported and exported quantities, then, reducing the tari¤ rate on this good alone is a superior policy in terms of increasing welfare and reducing pollution, relative to a consumer-priceneutral tari¤ reduction.
If its imported quantities exhibit the highest rate of pollution per unit of consumption as a fraction of its consumer price, relative to all other imported and exported quantities, then, reducing the tari¤ rate on this good alone it is an inferior policy in terms of reducing pollution, thus it can be an inferior policy in terms of increasing welfare, relative to a consumer-price-neutral tari¤ reduction. In this reform program we adjust trade and consumption taxes so that dp = dt and dq = dt + d = 0:
Considering the above reform program, we can write equations (4) and (6) in a vector format as follows:
Setting dt = t; where is a small positive scalar, in equations (20) and (21), we can easily conclude that in the present framework of di¤erent pollution rates per unit of consumption of imports and of domestically produced quantities of the same good, the above consumer-price-neutral proportional reform of taxes has an ambiguous impact on the country's welfare and tax revenues. This reform policy is welfare improving once there is no di¤erence in pollution per unit of consumption between imported and domestically produced quantities of the same good, i.e., a a = 0. Furthermore, it is also revenue increasing if in addition to being welfare improving, (t 0 + 0 ) is non-negative.
Using equations (21), and setting dt = it can be shown that this consumer-priceneutral reduction in trade taxes is welfare improving. That is:
where is a (N 1) vector, whose j th element is j = t j +e z a j a j = p j j when the j th good is an importable, and it is j = t j when the j th good is an exportable. Note that even for the importable goods j can be negative. Thus, if we adjust trade taxes according to the rule dt = [t + e z (a a )] = , then welfare improves. This is what we call welfare cost rule and it includes the direct cost due to production distortion, and the pollution e¤ect. This rule dictates that even if all speci…c tari¤s are the same, their reduction will not be the same. The most reduced tari¤ is the one on the importable good with the highest positive di¤erence in pollution per unit of consumption between its domestically produced and imported quantities, relative to all other goods. That is, assuming that all tari¤s are the same, the welfare cost rule calls for the highest reduction in t j for the good with the highest positive di¤erence e z a j a j . Thus, for the importable goods whose j is positive we reduce the tari¤ rate. For the importables for which j is negative, we increase the tari¤ rate. For the exportable goods we decrease the export tax. In this way, we adjust trade taxes in order to move the welfare cost on each good towards uniformity.
Observing, however, equation (20) we conclude that even the above welfare improving consumer-price-neutral reform rule continues to deliver ambiguous tax revenue e¤ects.
The consumption of goods produced in di¤erent countries can generate di¤erent pollution per unit of consumption. Recognizing this real world phenomenon, the paper develops a small open economy model producing many traded goods, whose consumption generates pollution and where the pollution per unit of consumption between the imported and the domestically produced quantities of the same good is di¤erent. Within this framework we show that the …rst best policy combination calls for (i) consumption taxes on all polluting goods whose rates depends on their pollution per unit of consumption, (ii) free trade for all the exported goods and (iii) a tari¤, or an import subsidy, or free trade on an imported good if the pollution per unit of its consumption of the imported quantities is, respectively, higher, or lower, or the same with that of the quantities of the same good that are domestically produced. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature on Border
Tax Adjustment (BTA) measures by showing that in the absence of emission taxes, the optimal policy is to introduce tari¤s or import subsidies in addition to consumption taxes.
Our analysis identi…es conditions under which a policy reform which reduces the tari¤ rate and increases the consumption tax on a good that keeps its consumer price constant increases welfare and tax revenue. This policy reform improves welfare when the welfare cost ratio of goods due to the tari¤s, which in addition to the production distortion includes the pollution e¤ect, move towards uniformity. We show that reducing only the tari¤ rate on a good is a welfare superior policy relative to a consumer-priceneutral reduction in the tari¤ and increase in the consumption tax, if it carries the highest tari¤ rate and in addition its imported quantities generate the lowest pollution per unit of consumption relative to all imported and exported quantities (a negative pollution e¤ect). If, however, the pollution e¤ect is positive, i.e., its imported quantities generate the highest pollution per unit of consumption relative to all imported and exported quantities, and is also su¢ ciently large, then we have a reversal of the well known result and in this case reducing only the tari¤ is a welfare inferior policy compare to the case where we reduce the tari¤ rate and increase its consumption tax as to keep its consumer price constant. Finally, we show that a consumer-price neutral adjustment in trade taxes which moves the welfare cost on all goods towards uniformity, is welfare improving.
